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TORRENS TITLES AND TITLE INSURANCE
By EDWARD H. CUSHMAN t
I. HISTORICAL
Under the system of recording established in Pennsylvania since the
days of William Penn, the title to real estate is subject to all defects in its
entire recorded history. The object of the Torrens system of land regis-
tration is to procure the transfer of title to real estate with speed and safety
at reduced costs. The question to be considered is whether this system, if
adopted in Pennsylvania, would have such an effect, or whether it is not in
the best interest of the public that the use of corporate title insurance, under
reasonable regulations, be extended and the recording system retained.
Under the English Merchants' Shipping Law, a page in a registry was
given to each ship registered. Here was listed the name and description
of the ship, the name of the owner, and any liens or encumbrances. A
certificate, being a duplicate of this page, was given to the owner. This
certificate constituted his evidence of ownership. All liens or claims against
the ship were required to be noted on the registry page so that the status
of the title could be ascertained by an inspection thereof. To transfer such
a title, the holder assigned his certificate, which certificate was taken to the
registry office, where the old certificate was cancelled, the old registry page
closed, and a new registry page opened. A copy of the new registry page,
in the form of a duplicate certificate, was furnished to the new owner. This
procedure made it unnecessary to examine prior cancelled certificates or to
consider the legality of prior transactions in order to determine the sufficiency
of the title.'
A commission in England appointed to consider the law of real property,
suggested in 1830 that a registry of title to land be established on the same
principles as a registry of stocks. This is the first reference to a plan for
registering titles of which there is any record in England. 2
While Commissioner of Customs in South Australia, Richard Torrens
observed the comparative ease with which the transfer of ships was consum-
mated. Subsequently, becoming a Register of Deeds, he endeavored to
apply this plan to the registration of titles in place of the old system of regis-
tration of the deeds. In 1857, while a member of the Colonial Ministry of
t LL.B., Temple University, 1920; author of LAW OF MECHANICS' LIENS IN PENNSYL-
VANIA (1926), and of The Proposed Uniform Mechanics' Lien Law (1932) 80 U. OF PA.
L. REV. 1O83.
I. Patton, The Torrens System of Land Title Registration (1935) 19 MINN. L. REV.
1 520.
2. NIBLACK, ANT ANALYSIS OF THE: TORRENs SYSTEM OF CONVEYING LAND (1912) 7.
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the Province of South Australia, he introduced a bill for the registration
of titles to real estate which became the law of South Australia in I858.3
There have been many amendments to and revisions of the original Torrens
Law in Australia.
4
The first state in the United States to seek to adopt the Torrens system
of land registration was Illinois. 5 This act was declared unconstitutional
on the ground, inter alia, that the provision authorizing the registrar to
examine the facts in relation to the title and to issue a certificate of ownership
was a prohibited delegation of judicial power. It was held that the regis-
trar's certificate would be, in effect, an adjudication that the person named
therein was the owner of the fee.6
A statute adopted by Ohio in 1896 7 did not require one known to
claim the title in fee simple adversely to the applicant to be named in the
application, nor to be notified of the proceedings. As to him, the only
requirement was notice by publication. This act was likewise held uncon-
stitutional."
Illinois, in 1897, enacted the first statute establishing the Torrens
system which has been held constitutional.9 This act required ownership
of the property to be determined by a decree entered in a court of competent
jurisdiction and imposed upon the registrar the duty of issuing the certificate
of registration upon the decree. The contention that this act permitted a
ministerial officer to perform judicial functions was held untenable.10 The
mere fact that an act requires a registrar to inquire into the existence of
certain facts and to apply the law to them for the purpose of determining
what his official conduct shall be, or the fact that the action of the official
may affect private rights, does not, strictly speaking, constitute an exercise
of judicial power. The act of the examiner in passing upon title relieves the
judges of onerous duties, and of course the court is presumed to review the
opinion of its examiner and is not bound by his conclusions. Massachusetts
in 1898 established a separate court known during its first years as "The
3. Australia Acts 1857-1858, no. 15, cited in NIBLACK, op. Cit. supra note 2, at 8.
4. HOGG, AUSTRALIAN TORRENS SYSTEm (1905).
5. Ill. Laws 1895, p. 107. See 3 DEVLIN, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY AND DEEDS (3d
ed. I911) 2607.
6. People v. Chase, 165 Ill. 527, 46 N. E. 454 (1896).
7. Ohio Laws 1896, p. 220.
8. State v. Guilbert, 56 Ohio St. 575, 47 N. E. 551 (1897). Thereafter, the Ohio Con-
stitution was amended and a new statute adopted. See OHIo CONST. art. II, § 4o; OHIO
CODE ANN. (Throckmorton's Baldwin, 1934) § 8572-I et seq.
9. Ill Laws 1897, p. 141. See People v. Simon, 176 Ill. 165, 52 N. E. 9IO (1898).
io. See Constitutionality of Provisions of Torrens Law for Constructive Notice (1921)
ii A. L. R. 772. The annotator concludes "The danger to vested rights involved in taking
away a title without personal notice to the owner is not lessened by the judicial reassurance
that the courts will protect the absent." Id. at 775. See also City of New York v. Wright,
243 N. Y. 8o, 152 N. E. 472 (1926).
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Court of Registration", now as "The Land Court". 1 However, as one
authority has pointed out, these laws differ materially from those proposed
by Sir Robert Torrens.
12
Nineteen states, as well as Porto Rico, Hawaii and the Philippines,
have enacted laws pertaining to the Torrens system of land registration. 13
However, with the exception of Cook County, Illinois, Los Angeles, Cali-
fornia, and the states of Massachusetts and Minnesota, the law is not in use
to any great extent. 14  Even in Chicago, Los Angeles and Massachusetts, the
record titles greatly exceed the Torrens titles.
II. STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The subject of title registration was considered by the Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws from 1903 to 1916, and in 1916 the American Bar
Association endorsed the Torrens system.' 5 In describing the system, the
plan as recommended by the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 16 will
1i. Mass. Acts i898, c. 562. The constitutionality of this act was sustained in Tyler
v. judges of the Court of Registration, 175 Mass. 71, 55 N. E. 812 (igoo). The present act
Will be found in note 13, infra.
12. "The act as drawn by him (the drafter of the Massachusetts act) is not a Torrens
act. The very foundation of our land registration system is the one thing which it was
the purpose of Sir Robert Richard Torrens to get rid of, namely, a judicial proceeding."
Davis, Chief Judge of the Land Court of Massachusetts, quoted in TANNER, REGISTRATION
OF TITLES TO REAL ESTATE IN MASSACHUSETTS, ILLINOIS AND CALIFORNIA, AND SUGGES-
TIONS APPLICABLE TO NEW YORK (1935) 6.
13. 3 CAL. GEN. LAWS (Deering, 1931) tit. 6oi, acts 86og, 861o, and see also id. at tit.
599, act 8589; 2 COLO. ANN. STAT. (Courtright's Mills, 1935) c. 40, art. 5; GA. CODE (933)
tit. 6o; 27 ILL. STAT. ANN. (Callaghan, 1936) c. 132; 2 MAss. GEN. LAWS (1932) C. i85; 2
MINN. STAT. (Mason, 1927) c. 65; MISS. CODE ANN. (Hemingway, 1927) §§ 6124-8167
[repealed by Miss. CODE (1930) § 3]; NEB. COM P. STAT. (1929) c. 76, §§ 701-798; N. Y.
CONS. LAWS (Cahill, 193o) c. 51, §§370-435; N. C. CODE (Michie, 1935) §§ 2377-2428;
N. D. ComP. LAWS (Supp. 1925) 33 56o4ax-56o4a82; OHIO CODE ANN. (Throckmorton's
Baldwin, i934) §§ 8572-1-8572-118; 3 ORE. CODE ANN. (1930) tit. 63, §§ 63-301--63-3108;
S. C. Acts 1916, p. 942 [omitted from S. C. CODE (1932), and repealed under S. C. CONST.
art. 6, § 5] ; I S. D. CoMP. LAWS (1929) §§ 3060-3143; I TENN. CODE ANN. (Shannon, 1917)
§§ S-3793-S-3796 [repealed by TENN. CODE (1932) § 2] ; UTAH COMP. LAWS (917) §§ 4820-
5oo8 [repealed by UTAH REv. STAT. ANN. (I933) tit. 88, c. I, § 2] ; VA. CODE ANN. (1930)
§ 5225; ii WASH. REv. STAT. (Remington, 1933) tit. 7, §§ io622-IO726.
On November 2, 1915, an amendment was adopted to the Constitution of Pennsylvania
authorizing legislation providing for a system of registering and insuring land titles by the
state or counties thereof. PA. CONST. (Purdon, 1930) 522. This amendment has not been
assigned to any definite section of the constitution.
14. In California, Colorado, and Illinois, the total registration is said to be approximately
one per cent of aggregate transfers. But in Massachusetts approximately ten per cent of
the titles are registered under the Land Court. TANNER, op. cit. supra note 12, at I9; McCall,
The Torrens System-After Thirty-five Years (1932) Io N. C. L. REV. 329, 333. The Tor-
rens law has been practically a dead letter in San Francisco, but in Los Angeles County out
of approximately 1,200,000 parcels of land separately assessed for taxation, around 8,5oo are
registered under the Torrens plan. TANNER, op. cit. supra note 12, at 44-49. In Minneapolis,
a substantial number of properties are registered thereunder. PATTON, MANUAL OF T0xRENS
PROCEDuRE (1936) 27, 29. In North Carolina, large tracts of swamp land purchased by lum-
ber companies have been registered under the Torrens system for the purpose of defining
boundaries and attaining a legal defense to the claims of squatters. Land development com-
panies throughout the United States have likewise registered title to unimproved tracts. Mc-
Call, supra, at 337, 339.
15. 41 REP. Am. BAR ASS'N (1916) 428.
16. Uniform Land Registration Act, 9 U. L. A. 217. See THOMPSON, ABSTRACTS AND
TITLES (2d ed. 1930) § 796, 797, for miscellaneous provisions common to all statutes and
provisions as to which statutes vary.
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be considered and no attempt will be made to discuss in detail the differences
in the existing legislation. The basic principle of this system is the regis-
tration of the title to land instead of, as the old system requires, the evidence
of such title. In the one case, only the ultimate fact or conclusion that a
certain named party has title to a particular tract of land is registered, and
a certificate thereof is delivered to him. In the other case, the evidence from
which the prospective purchaser, or the company insuring his title, must
at their peril draw such conclusion is registered. 17  The purpose of the Tor-
rens law is to create a judgment in rem, perpetually conclusive.' 8
The Uniform Land Registration Act establishes a court of land
registration for the purpose of settlement, registration, transfer and assur-
ance of title.19 The clerks of these courts are constituted registrars of title
who are authorized, under the direction of the court, to issue process and
enter the court's decree touching land in their respective communities, as well
as to enter and issue certificates of title.20  The courts are given power to
appoint attorneys at law as examiners of title to search the records, investi-
gate all facts stated in the petition or otherwise brought to their notice in
any case, and to make a report to the court with a certificate of their exami-
nation of title and findings of fact.21
Suits for registration of title are begun by a petition to the court by a
person or persons claiming an estate in fee simple to the land,2 2 which petition
is required to set forth, inter alia, the name and marital status of the peti-
tioner, a description of the land and improvements thereon, and all known
liens, interests and claims, adverse or otherwise, vested or contingent, as well
as the full names and addresses, if known, of all parties who may claim an
interest, including the adjoining owners. 23
This petition is referred by the court to an examiner of title,24 who,
after notice by publication and summons, hears the parties, receives evi-
dence,25 and submits a report to the court. This report includes an abstract
of title to the land, such extracts from the records as will enable the court
to decide the question involved and the names and addresses, as far as has
been ascertained, of all persons interested in the land as well as adjoining
17. In re Bickel, 3O Ill. 484, 134 N. E. 76 (1922); State ex rel. Wallace v. Westfall,
85 Minn. 437, 89 N. W. 175 (1902).
18. Smith v. Marion, 69 Misc. xo8, 124 N. Y. Supp. 1O64 (Sup. Ct. 19o).
19. Uniform Land Registration Act, § 4, 9 U. L. A. 224. In Illinois the statute con-
templates setting up a separate unit within the recorder's office pertaining to the registration
of titles, thus making the recorder of deeds the registrar of titles and combining in the
same office the dual function of recording evidences of title and of registering Torrens titles.
ILL. REV. STAT. (Cahill, 1933) c. 30, 49.
20. Uniform Land Registration Act, §§ 14, i5, 9 U. L. A. 226-227. The following foot-
notes all refer to the sections of said Uniform Land Registration Act therein specified.
21. § 16, 9 U. L. A. 227.
22. § 17, 9 id. 227.
23. § 21, 9 id. 228.
24. §25, 9 id. 229.
25. § 16, 9 id. 227.
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owners and occupants, showing their several interests and indicating upon
whom and in what manner process should be served or notice given.
26
Upon the filing of the report of the examiner of titles, the court
requires notice thereof to be given to all persons shown therein to be entitled
to it, in addition to notice by publication 27 and by posting.28  A copy of the
order of publication must be mailed by registered letter to every interested
person named in the petition or in the report of the examiner of titles whose
address is given or known. 29 Personal service of process is required upon
residents of the state not under disability who are made known to the court
before final decree and can be reached by its process, unless such service
is waived.30  Any person having any interest in or claim against the land,
whether or not named in the petition and order of publication, may appear
and file an answer.
3 '
If the court after final hearing is of the opinion that the petitioner has
title proper for registration, a decree of confirmation and registration is
entered which binds the land, quiets the title, and is forever binding and
conclusive upon all persons, resident or non-resident, including the state,
whether mentioned by name in the order of publication or included in the
general description "to all whom it may concern". This decree may not be
attacked or opened or set aside by reason of the absence, infancy, or other
disability of any person affected by it, nor by any proceedings at law or in
equity for rehearing or reversing judgments or decrees, except as provided
in the statute.
3 2
Every decree of initial registration and subsequent memorial must be
in prescribed form, showing the details with respect to ownership and dis-
ability of the parties. It must contain a description of the land, the estate
of the owner, and the liens and encumbrances upon it, and must be prepared,
recorded and indexed.33 When this decree or memorial is registered, it
26. § 26, 9 id. 229. The examiner usually requires a complete abstract showing the com-
plete chain of title and such additional proof as is deemed pertinent. "In some states, the
abstracters and title companies that first opposed the system on the supposition that it
menaced the continuation of their business have found that any such result is remote and
that abstract continuations required for initial registration proceedings more than offset their
loss of business because of lack of need for abstracts in subsequent transactions." PATToN,
op. cit. supra note 14, at 25.
27. § 27, 9 U. L. A. 23o. In Minnesota, the statute divides the defendants, for the purpose
of service, into five classes: residents of the state, non-residents of the state, the state, de-
fendants of unknown address, and "all other persons or parties unknown claiming any . . .
estate . . . in the real estate". The summons is required to be served as in a civil action
upon all defendants who are residents of the state except those of unknown address. 2
MIN . STAT. (Mason, 1927) § 8262.
28. §29, 9 U. L. A. 230.
29. § 28, ibid.
30. § 31, ibid.
31. § 36, 9 id. 231.
32. § 44, 9 id. 234. For discussion of the conclusiveness of a Torrens title, see infra part
III.
33. §§ 45, 47, 9 ul. 234, 235.
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constitutes the original certificate of title a4 and, when entered by the registrar
of titles in the appropriate title books, is conclusive evidence of all matters
therein contained, except as otherwise provided in the act."3 A duplicate
copy of the certificate of title is delivered to the owner.3 6
The procedure pertaining to a voluntary transfer of registered title is
simple and convenient, in contrast to the procedure for initial registration.
When the owner of registered land agrees to dispose of his interest, he
delivers a deed to the registrar and relinquishes his duplicate certificate for
registration. A new certificate is issued to the purchaser.37  The deed is
duly filed by the recorder. Should the new owner demand a deed, the grantor
is required to execute two deeds, one of which is stamped "duplicate" and is
given to the new certificate holder. If only a portion of such estate is trans-
ferred, or in case of an encumbrance or lease for more than one year, the
transaction is noted and registered, and new certificates are issued for the
portions transferred and the portions not transferred. 38
All mortgages, liens, long term leases, judgments, eminent domain pro-
ceedings, etc., to constitute valid notice and to affect the registered title are
required to be filed with the registrar. The registrar notes them as memo-
rials on the original certificate. 39 Consequently, after a title has been duly
registered, there is no need to re-examine the chain of title upon a subsequent
conveyance or encumbrance. However, if there are a substantial
number of outstanding memorials, an experienced individual may be re-
quired to determine the precise status of the title.
40
Lands or any estate or interest therein registered under the act, upon
the death of the owner, testate or intestate, go to his personal representatives
in the same manner as personal property, and are subject with certain
qualifications to the same rules of administration as personalty. 41 How-
ever, the administrator is not entitled to a commission with respect to the real
estate except in case of necessary sales in due course of administration.
42
In the case of involuntary transfers, the procedure is no more expe-
ditious than under the recording system. The registrar may not recognize
such transfer unless accompanied by an order of court directing him to
proceed with the registration. Such orders of court may be entered by a
34. § 48, 9 id. 235.
35. § 51, 9 id. 236.
36. § 52, ibid. Also see PATT oN, op. cit. supra note 14, at 12.
37. §§ 54, 57, 9 U. L. A. 236, 237. See also PATTON, op. cit. supra note 14, at 12.
38. § 54, 9 U. L. A. 236.
39. § 56, 9 id. 237. See also Patton, supra note I, at 527.
40. The memorials in the decree and certificate are necessarily brief, being merely the
recording references in Massachusetts. If the memorial shows the property is subject to a
trust, party wall agreement, restrictive covenant, easement or any other encumbrance, it is
advisable to examine the instrument cited in the memorial. TANNER, op. cit. S1pra note
2, at 23, 24.
41. Uniform Land Registration Act, § 6i, 9 U. L. A. 238.
42. § 62, ibid.
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probate courf in the form of a final decree of distribution or may be made
in another court as, for instance, a decree of partition. It may be merely an
order of an appropriate court directing a conveyance. In all such cases, if the
proceedings are jurisdictionally regular and the time for appeal has expired,
the court's order to the registrar to make the transfer by cancellation of the
outstanding certificate and the issuance of a new certificate is made without
notice, all rights having been adjudicated in the legal proceedings.
43
Any registered owner of an estate or interest in land or any person
having any claim against registered land arising from any cause other than
fraud or forgery may, within ninety days after the claim or cause of com-
plaint, petition the court for relief.44 Registration procured through fraud
or forgery may be set aside by the court, but the rights and title of an
intervening registered encumbrancer or bona fide purchaser for value are
not affected thereby. The injured party may pursue all his legal and equita-
ble remedies against the party or parties to the fraud or forgery.
45
Every registered holder of an estate or interest in land under the act
may hold it free from any and all adverse claims, rights or encumbrances
not noted on the certificate of title, except for certain liens, claims or rights
arising under the laws or Constitution of the United States, taxes and levies
assessed but not delinquent, and any lease for a term not exceeding one year
under which the land is actually occupied. 46  This provision does not apply
to the benefit of a registered owner in case of fraud or forgery to which he
is a party or in which he is privy without having paid valuable consideration
in good faith.47  No title to, nor right nor interest in, registered land in
derogation of that of the registered owner may be acquired by prescription or
adverse possession.
48
Any person having no actual notice of a registration under the act by
which he is deprived of an estate in land and who is without remedy under
the act may bring an action for the payment of his damages out of an assur-
ance fund created by fees paid at the time of registration.49
III. CONCLUSIVENESS OF TITLE
Opponents of the Torrens system contend that it is not conclusive in
a number of material particulars and that an independent search is essential
to protect a grantee or mortgagee against claims of the United States, bank-
43. PATTON, op. cit. supra note 14, at 13.
44. § 68, 9 U. L. A. 240.
45. § 73, 9 id. at 241.
46. § 74, 9 id. at 242. The exceptions differ in the various states. The usual matters
excepted are rights of appeal, short-term leases, rights on public highways, current taxes
and certain liens or rights arising under the laws of the United States. See infra part III;
PATTON, op. cit. .rupra note 14, at 14.
47. § 75, 9 U. L. A. 242.
48. § 77, ibid. See infra notes 70-73.
49. § 83, 9 id. at 244.
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ruptcy of the parties, current taxes, short term leases, rights of appeal,
mechanics' liens, and other possible adverse claims.50
The statement made by proponents of the Torrens system that a Tor-
rens title in these particulars is as conclusive as a deed given under the
recording system 51 is unquestionably true but is nevertheless incomplete so
far as the question considered in this article is concerned. Where the con-
veyance under the recording system is accompanied by an adequate policy of
title insurance, the owner or mortgagee is protected against such defects and
the expense incident to defending a suit if his title is attacked. A Torrens
title holder, even if he can bring his claim within the provisions of the assur-
ance fund and that fund be adequate to defray his claim, has the burden and
the expense incident to maintaining a suit against the fund.
52
Taxes
Prior to the Act of Congress of August I, 1888," in those states where
a judgment on the execution of the state court created a lien only within
the county in which the judgment, was entered, a similar proceeding in the
federal court created a lien to the extent of its jurisdiction.54 This statute
was the first formal act to regulate fully the liens of judgments and decrees
of the federal courts. It provides that judgments and decrees entered in the
federal court within any state shall be liens on property throughout the state,
in the same manner and to the same extent as if they had been rendered by
a court of general jurisdiction of the state. The clerks of the several courts
are required to keep appropriate records. In the absence of a state law
5o. For an extended discussion see Staples, Conclusiveness of a Torrens Certificate of
Title, 8 MINN. L. R. 20o (1924). Under the system now in force, as well as in localities
where the Torrens system is the law, it is still essential to make a separate search for liens
in anticipation of or resulting from suits or mechanics' liens, county, state, city and other
taxes, bankruptcies, and federal estate tax liens. A Torrens examiner, before passing anew
a title which has been registered some years previous, brings its history to date by a com-
prehensive search for possible bankruptcy since 1898 and liens for federal estate taxes after
the owner's death until 1916, as well as by the invariable examination for local taxes. MAS-
SACHUSETTS CONVEYANcERS AssocIATION, THE LAND COURT OF MASSACHUSETTS (1936) 4.
The exceptions to which a Torrens title in Massachusetts is subject, in addition to
those noted in the certificate, include items other than those mentioned in this article.
2 MASs. GEN. LAws (1932) c. 185, § 46. See also Hooper v. Haas, 332 Ill. 561, 164 N. E.
23 (1928) ; Hawes v. Clarke, 159 App. Div. 65 (1913) 144 N. Y. Supp. ii (Ist Dep't, 1913) ;
Partenfelder v. People, 211 N. Y. 355, lO5 N. E. 675 (1914) ; In re Harper, io6 Misc. 514,
176 N. Y. Supp. 337 (Sup. Ct. 1919).
51. PATTON, op. cit. supra note 14, at 14-23.
52. An extreme case is Gill v. Johnson, wherein a suit growing out of a fraudulent regis-
tration in 1917 is still pending in the courts of California on a judgment entered in favor of
the plaintiff in the sum of $48,ooo after one suit in the federal courts and five appeals in the
state courts. Gill v. Frances Investment Co., ig F. (2d) 88o (C. C. A. 9th, 1927; Gill v. John-
son, 1O3 Cal. App. 234, 284 Pac. 510 (I93O), i1O Cal. App. 442, 294 Pac. 405 (1930), 125 Cal.
App. 296, 13 P. (2d) 857 (1932), 125 Cal. App. 302, 14 P. (2d) 1017 (1932), 8 Cal. App. (2d)
369, 48 P. (2d) 139 (1935). A sixth appeal is now pending.
53. 25 STAT. 357, 28 U. S. C. A. § 812 (1928).
54. Massingill v. Downs, 48 U. S. 76o (1849); Williams v. Benedict, 49 U. S. io7
(1850) ; Brown v. Pierce, 74 U. S. 205 (1868).
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providing conformity as to recording, etc., between liens and judgments
of the federal courts and judgments of the state courts, a judgment in a
federal district court is a lien on all lands of the judgment creditor within the
court's territorial jurisdiction.55
In 1928 Congress provided6 6 that a lien for taxes in favor of the United
States shall not be valid as against any mortgagee, purchaser or judgment
creditor until notice of it has been filed by the collector in accordance with
the laws of the state in which the property subject to the lien is situated.
A search, whether the title be that of a Torrens certificate or pursuant
to the recording system, is required not only for federal taxes but also for
various taxes due to the state and its political sub-divisions.57 While the loss
records of many title insurance companies are inadequate and incomplete, it
is certain that the losses due to non-payment of taxes constitute a substan-
tial proportion of the losses, as do also those arising from judgment liens and
forgeries. 58 The risk incident to bankruptcy of the title owner is one to
which the holder of a Torrens title, as well as the holder of a title under a
recording act, is subject and against which the holder of title insurance is
protected. 9
Many of the particulars wherein a Torrens certificate is inconclusive,
such as the right of appeal from the decree of the court in reference to the
original registration of the title and also in connection with the certificate
issued following an involuntary transfer, constitute hazards which are less
serious than would exist if the right of appeal were not reserved. It should
be noted, however, that most decrees of court are entered by default on a
record which would not afford any ground for reversal, and that the combined
care bestowed upon such proceedings by the applicant's attorney, the exam-
iner of title, and the court precludes the likelihood of judicial error.60
55. Rhea v. Smith, 274 U. S. 434 (1927) ; United States v. Harpootlin, 24 F. (2d) 646
(C. C. A. 2nd, 1928).
56. 45 STAT. 875; 26 U. S. C. A. § 1562 (1935). The Pennsylvania supporting act is that
of May 1, 1929, PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 193o) tit. 74, §§ i41, 147.
57. E. g., taxes due by corporations, liquid fuel tax, income and inheritance taxes, gift
taxes, city, borough, county, school, road and poor taxes, etc. An official search can be
obtained with respect to taxes due the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania by corporations and,
in some of the larger cities, for municipal taxes.
58. See 12 PRoc. Am. TiT. Ass'x (1932) 36, for a series of articles with respect to
claims against title insurance companies.
59. Isaacs v. Hobbs Tie & Timber Co., 282 U. S. 734 (931); Stratton v. New, 283
U. S. 318 (193i).
The Chief Examiner in Cook County, Illinois, contends that a search under the bank-
ruptcy statute or for other federal liens is unnecessary, inasmuch as the state law regard-
ing title to property located within the state should be supreme. TANNE , op. Cit. supra
note 12, at 39.
PATToN, op. ct. supra note 14, at 2o-21, states that judgments in the federal courts
are subject to the provisions of the Minnesota statute [MiNN. STAT. (Mason, X927) § 83091,
which provides that a personal judgment against the owner in either the state or federal
court is not a lien unless a certified copy of the judgment entry appears as a memorial in
the certificate of title, as provided in 25 STAT. 357, 28 U. S. C. A. § 8r2 (1928). See supra
note 54.
6o. PATToN, op. cit. supra note x4, at i5.
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There is no uniform provision in the Torrens system for the protection
of an owner or one possessing an interest where the decree has been obtained
by fraud. 61  However, where the statute is silent it must be presumed that
the legislature understood and expected that the courts of equity would remain
open to parties able to bring themselves within the rules which require the
granting of equitable relief. The fact that a statute does not expressly pro-
vide that fraud shall invalidate acts authorized to be done under it should
not deprive the courts of the general power to protect the rights of the
parties. Equity will not allow a party to retain the benefit of a fraudulent
transaction, although obtained under the forms of law.
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Service of Notice
A more serious objection to the alleged conclusiveness of a Torrens title
is the fact that notwithstanding the provision that notice by publication,
posting and registered mail shall be conclusive and binding upon all the
world,63 by the great weight of authority, the owner of a vested interest
in possession of the premises not served in a registration proceeding would
not be deprived of his title if the applicant knew, or had reason to know,
of the title or claim of the person not so served. 64  Only known resident
claimants need be personally served. It has been held constitutional to
obtain jurisdiction of unknown resident and known or unknown non-
resident claimants by publication. 65  Even a known resident within the
state may be served by registered mail. Such a service has been held not
to be a denial of due process within the meaning of the Federal Constitu-
tion.6 The holder of a Torrens title certificate pursuant to a decree of court
may find that the appellate court will hold the decree either void on the
ground of fraud or not binding on persons not properly served with notice
of the proceeding.6"
61. 3 DEvIN, op. Cit. supra note 5, at 2640, 2646.
62. Baart v. Martin, 99 Minn. 197, io8 N. W. 945 (1906). See Uniform Land Regis-
tration Act, § 75, 9 U. L. A. 242.
63. §§ 27, 28, 29, 31, 32, 9 id. at 230.
64. Gill v. Frances Investment Co., 1g F. (2d) 88o, (C. C. A. 9th, 1927) ; Follette v.
Pacific Light & Power Co., 189 Cal. 193, 2o8 Pac. 295 (1922) ; Moakley v. Los Angeles
Pac. Ry., 99 Cal. App. 74, 277 Pac. 883 (1929) ; Sheaff v. Spindler, 339 Ill. 540, 171 N. E.
632 (1930) ; Riley v. Pearson, 120 Minn. 21o, 139 N. W. 361 (1913) ; Meighan v. Rohe, 166
App. Div. 175, 151 N. Y. Supp. 785 (ist Dep't, 1914); Belmont Powell Holding Co. v.
Serial Loan Ass'n, 167 App. Div. 124, 152 N. Y. Supp. 868 (2d Dep't, 1915). But see
Sterling Nat'l Bank v. Fisher, 75 Colo. 371, 226 Pac. 146 (1924) ; Thompson, Analysis of the
Disadvantages of the Torrens System (1918) 87 CENT. L. J. 26o. See also Staples, supra
note 50.
65. American Land Co. v. Zeiss, 219 U. S. 47 (1911); Mills v. Denver & R. G. Ry.,
198 Fed. 137 (D. C. Colo. 1912) ; State ex rel. Douglas v. Westfall, 85 Minn. 437, 89
N. W. 175 (1902) ; Hunt v. Hay, 214 N. Y. 578, lo8 N. E. 851 (1915).
66. City of New York v. Wright, 243 N. Y. 8o, 152 N. E. 472 (1926). Such satisfac-
tion of a constitutional requirement need not necessarily be equivalent to satisfaction of a
prospective lender of a substantial sum of money upon a mortgage.
67. In Follette v. Pacific Light & Power Co., 189 Cal. 193, 2o8 Pac. 295 (1922), the
court did not base its conclusions exclusively on the absence of good faith. No jurisdic-
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The inconclusiveness of a Torrens title due to non-joinder of a person
in possession arises only where no adequate investigation of occupancy has
been made. In Minnesota, one of the duties of the examiner is to investigate
and report as to whether or not the land is occupied. 68 Many examiners
make a personal inspection. Others rely upon an affidavit of the applicant
or his attorney, or upon an examination by the sheriff. In the report all
occupants, and the parties who encroach upon the premises, such as owners
of adjacent buildings the eaves of which project beyond the property line,
telephone companies whose wires are overhead, etc., are recommended to be
made parties defendant so that their rights may be determined from the
evidence introduced at the hearing.
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Bona Fide Purchasers
The Uniform Land Registration Act expressly eliminates the possibility
of loss of ownership due to adverse possession.70 In the absence of such
a provision it has been held that title to land already registered may be ac-
quired by adverse possession.7 1 The Nebraska statute provides that ten
years' adverse possession will deprive a registered owner of his title.72 In
Minnesota there is a further exception in favor of one in possession under
an unregistered deed or contract for a deed.73 A case usually cited by the
protagonists of the Torrens System as showing the conclusiveness of a
certificate in the hands of a bona fide owner, and which is cited by opponents
of the law to illustrate the ease with which a person may be defrauded of
his property, is Elliason v. Wilborn.74 In this case equitable relief was de-
nied the owner of the property who, by delivering his duplicate certificate
to another, gave him the power to transfer title to a bona fide purchaser.
If the purchaser of a certificate of title has knowledge that the vendor
has previously failed to give notice to an interested party, the purchaser's
title is subject to the claims of that party.7 5 In one case where the assignee
of a mortgage procured a notation of the assignment upon the title registry
but failed to notify the owner, and the owner in good faith paid the amount
tlion having been obtained in the registration proceedings on the person in possession of the
premises, it was held that the provisions of the land title law, which purported to entitle
the purchaser of the registered title to the premises to hold it as against the person in pos-
session, were in violation of the due process clause.
68. MINN. STAT. (Mason, 1927) § 8259.
69. PATTON, op. cit. supra note 14, at 38.
7o. Uniform Land Registration Act, § 77, 9 U. L. A. 242.
71. Belize Estate & Produce Co. v. Quilter, [1897] 22 A. C. 367; Harris v. Keith, 3
Alberta L. R. 222 (1911) ; Wallace v. Potter, 6 Alberta L. R. 83 (1913). See also HOGG,
op. cit. mipra note 4, at 85.
72. NEB. ComP. STAT. (1929) c. 76, § 741.
73. PATTON, op. cit. supra note 14, at 14.
74. 281 U. S. 457 (930), aff'g 335 Ill. 352, 167 N. E. ioi (1929). The law in Aus-
tralia is otherwise. See (1936) 9 AusT. L. J. 355.
75. Gill v. Frances Investment Co., ig F. (2d) 88o (C. C. A. 9th, 1927), supra note 52.
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of the mortgage to the original mortgagee, it was held that the mortgage
was discharged, despite the provision in the statute that the registration of an
instrument under the Torrens system should constitute notice to all
persons.
76
Advocates of the Torrens law point out that its passage eliminates dan-
gers incident to the recording system, such as deeds executed pursuant to
forgery or undelivered powers of attorney. Likewise it affords an owner
a title unclouded by judgments entered against other persons of the same
name. However, it must be remembered that these disadvantages under the
recording system are not present if the grantor or the mortgagor is pro-
tected by title insurance.
IV. THE AsSURANCE FuND
Under the recording system, should a title prove defective, the grantee
has, for what it may be worth, his remedy against the grantor under his
warranty in the deed. A mortgagee, of course, has such rights as are avail-
able against the obligor on the bond, and both grantee and mortgagee retain,
under the recording system and also under the Torrens system, their equita-
ble remedies against the party or parties guilty of fraud or forgery. 77 Where
the settlement is accompanied by a policy of title insurance, the grantee or
the mortgagee has the additional security of the title policy.
The Torrens law provides for an assurance fund of one-tenth of one
per cent of the assessed value of the land upon original registration.7 8  Any
person who has actual notice of any registration under the act by which he
may be deprived of an estate or interest in land may, within two years after
the time when his right of action first accrued, bring suit against the state
treasury for recovery of damages out of the assurance fund.79  The laws
of many states confer such a right of action against the assurance fund only
to persons who sustain loss without negligence on their part.
8 0
76. Rea v. Kelly, 183 Minn. 194, 235 N. W. 91o (1931). A Minnesota statute provides
that the record of an assignment of mortgage shall not, of itself, be notice of such assign-
ment to the mortgagor so as to invalidate any payment made to the mortgagee. MINN.
STAT. (Mason, 1927) § 8225.
77. Uniform Land Registration Act, § 73, 9 U. L. A. 241.
78. § 8o, 9 id. at 243. In Minnesota, the fund is one-tenth of one per cent of the assessed
value of the land, exclusive of improvements on all original registrations and on all trans-
fers by descent or devise. 2 MINN. STAT. (Mason, 1927) § 832o. The fund is also in-
creased by the accumulation of interest.
In Massachusetts, upon original registration and also upon the entry of a certificate upon
the transfer of title by descent or devise, there is paid to the recorder one-tenth of one per
cent of the assessed value of the land on the basis of the last assessment for municipal
taxation, or, in case of the registration of an easement or right, one-tenth of one per cent
of the value thereof as found by the court, as an assurance fund. 2 MAss. GEN. LAws
(1932) c. 185, § 99.
79. Uniform Land Registration Act, § 83, 9 U. L. A. 244.
8o. 3 CAL. GEN. LAWS (Deering, 1931) Act 8589, § 105 (2); 2 MASS. GEN. LAws
(1932) C. 185, § 1o; 2 MINN. STAT. (Mason, 1927) § 8322; N. C. CoDE (1935) §2423; N. D.
CoMp. LAws (Supp. 1926) § 56o4-a75; OHIo CODE ANN. (Throckmorton's Baldwin, 1934)
§ 8572-104; 1 S. D. ComP. LAws (1929) § 3136.
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In many states the assurance fund has been more than adequate to meet
all claims thereunder. At the end of 1936 the assurance fund in Massachu-
setts was approximately $250,000, while the damages paid out of it were
only $2,3oo. sl In Cook County, Illinois, there was $444,962.97 in the in-
demnity fund on March 1, 1937, and the losses which had thus far been paid
amounted to $17,196.25.2 In the city of New York, the fund, including in-
terest accrued until March i, 1937, totalled $1,6o4.96, against which no claims
whatsoever have so far been presented.83 On the other hand, in Nebraska a
judgment was recovered in the sum of $19,890.25 against a county assur-
ance fund which then contained only $182.17.4
Recovery in Massachusetts is not only limited to persons who sustain
loss without negligence on their part, but is limited also to persons deprived of
registered land by the subsequent registration of other persons as owners of
the same land through fraud, or mistake. Furthermore, these persons are
required to exhaust all other remedies before resorting to an action against
the fund. 5 For errors committed in the original registration, the aggrieved
party has no claim against the assurance fund.
Massachusetts and North Carolina likewise provide that, if the assur-
ance fund at any time is not sufficient to meet the loss, the state trleasurer
shall make up the deficiency from any funds in the treasury not otherwise
appropriated. If this is done any amounts later received by the state treas-
urer on account of the assurance fund must be used to make up the deficiency
in the general fund.86  The assurance fund provision in Illinois seems to
imply that, if the fund were exhausted the credit of Cook County could be
used to make up the difference. 87 The law of Nebraska is similar in this
respect to that of Illinois. However, the Nebraska statute was held to limit
recovery to moneys in the assurance fund, the court having concluded that
under any other interpretation the statute would be in violation of the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.88 The constitutions of Cali-
81. See also TANNER, op. cit. supra note 12, at 15; Sabel, Suggestions for Amending the
Torrens Act (1935) 13 N. Y. U. L. Q. REV. 244, 250.
82. See also TANNER, op. cit. supra note 12, at 42; Laddey, The Torrens System of Land
Registration (1931) 54 N. J. L. J. 42. In Gill v. Johnson, supra note 52, the California court
entered judgment for the plaintiff in the sum of $48,0oo. The assurance fund in the state was
$39,829.99 on December 31, 1936.
83. Letter from Chamberlain of the City of New York to the writer, dated March P.,
1937. 84. Jones v. York County, 47 F. (2d) 837 (C. C. A. 8th, 1931).
85. 2 MAss. GEN. LAWS (1932) c. 185, § 10I.
86. 2 MAss. GEN. LAws (1932) c. 185, § 104; N. C. CODE (935) § 2425.
87. 27 ILL. STAT. ANN. (Callaghan, 1936) § 132.095.
88. Jones v. York County, 26 F. (2d) 623 (C. C. A. 8th, 1928). In holding the orig-
inal Torrens law of Ohio unconstitutional, it was decided that the statute violated the con-
stitutional provision prohibiting the talcing of private property except for public use after
due compensation to the owner. The court held that the owner of property not required
for public use had the right to retain the same in specie; that, if an owner's property were
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fornia and New York specifically prohibit the giving or loaning of any public
funds for private use.89
V. COSTS
An express purpose of the Torrens law is to bring about the cheaper
and more speedy settlement, registration and transfer of title.90 It is claimed
that the establishment of the system will decrease the expenses incident to
transferring title.91 This is generally true of a voluntary transfer of title
after it has been registered under the act,92 but the cost of initial registra-
tion exceeds the cost of title insurance.93 Moreover the cost incident to the
transfer of a registered title by descent or will or pursuant to an execution
sale or under a testamentary power is substantial.94
These costs do not include the expense of incidental reports or special
professional services which are sometimes required. Statistical data is not
available to show the average total cost of purchasing a tract of land under
the Torrens system and purchasing under the recording system with title
insurance. Accurate statistics are difficult to obtain and are of little value
for purposes of comparison because of the differences in labor and overhead
costs in different localities. R. G. Patton, one of the fairest and ablest
advocates of the Torrens system, concedes that it is probable that the expense
to the public at large is about the same under either system.9 5
A primary reason for the failure of the Torrens system to obtain popu-
larity in many states is the substantial expense incident to the original regis-
tration of title.96 The fees received for the registration of a Torrens title
do not actually cover the cost incident to its establishment.9 7 Since the
system is not on a self-sustaining basis, the public is in effect subsidizing the
taken away from him, the assurance fund might be insufficient to compensate him therefor
and that, in any event, he was obligated to prosecute a suit against the fund in order to seek
to recover the value of his property. See State v. Guilbert, 56 Ohio St. 575, 47 N. E. 551
(897). See also DMVLIN, op. cit. supra note 5, at 2617.
89. CAL. CONST. art. XII, § 13; N. Y. CONST. art. VII, § I, art. VIII, §§ 9, io. See opin-
ion of Attorney General Lewis in TANNER, op. cit. supra note 12, at 76.
9o. Uniform Land Registration Act, § 3, 9 U. L. A. 223.
91. 3 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (1920) § 58o; McCall, supra note 14, at 331.
92. For detailed statements as to the cost incident to voluntary transfer of title, see
HAAS, TORRENS AND REAL ESTATE DATA FOR COOK COUNTY (1927); TANNER, Op. Cit.
.supra note 12, at 26.
93. TANNER, op. cit. supra note 12, at 17; Patton, supra note I at 531, 532; Sabel, supra
-note 81, at 249.
94. ". - . in the case of an involuntary transfer, descent or devise, foreclosure, execu-
tion sale, probate deed and the like, an order of court and often an adjudication of validity
is required before the transfer can be made effective by issuance of a new certificate. The
need for a lawyer's service in effecting such transfers would appear to leave the gross ex-
pense of all transfers about the same. There is, however, a greatly reduced cost to the
public by a lessened expense in the keeping of title records." Patton, supra note I, at 522,
11. 4.
95. Ibid.
96. McCall, supra note 14, at 346.
97. ALLIN, MEMORANDUM UPON THE SYSTEM OF REGISTERING TITLES TO REAL PROP-
ERTY, COMMONLY KNOWN AS THE "TORRENS SYSTEM", IN NEW YORK AND SOME OTHER
STATES; TANNER, op. cit. supra note 12, at 51.
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registration offices and courts for the benefit of the relatively few persons
who deal frequently with real estate. Obviously, if a sufficient volume of
registration were secured this would not be true, but the relatively slight use
which has been made of the law in those states which have it warrants the
assumption that many years will elapse before a sustained public demand
will arise for a change of system in Pennsylvania.
The Torrens system requires either (i) a separate court as in Massa-
chusetts, where there are three judges trained in title work, a recorder, a
chief examiner, an assistant clerk and others, including an engineering de-
partment; 98 or (2) the examination by judges of existing courts of the
reports of the examiners of title, process servers, a comprehensive title plant,
and a skilled personnel for examining, interpreting and filing the records.
The rules of real property are complicated. The services of experts are
required to interpret the facts revealed by prior documents and the current
search. While the indices are available as public records, trained minds are
needed to comprehend the records to which they open the doors. There is
no place for political drones either in a title plant or in the Torrens system
set up. Even for the transfer of a title already registered there must be a
re-examination of title at least back to the date of the prior registration. 9
It is idle to contend that this technical work can be performed by public
officials more efficiently or more cheaply than it is performed by private
corporations which issue specific obligations of title insurance.100
VI. SPEEDY TRANSFER
Not all Torrens titles can be with safety transferred as speedily as can
title to automobiles under the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Act.'01 Whether
or not such a desirable object is attainable in foreign countries, in the United
States it is frustrated by the constitutional requirement of due process which
makes court proceedings essential in connection with the initial transfer to
the Torrens system and with the devolution of title by descent or devise,
etc. Since lack of jurisdiction may impeach a Torrens title,10 2 all parties
in interest must be served with notice of the proceeding, either personally or
by publication and posting. Whether the advertisement need appear but
98. See MASSACHUSTS CONVEYANCERS AssoCIATION, op. cit. supra note 5o.
The Hon. Clarence C. Smith, Associate Judge of the Land Court of Massachusetts, in a
letter to the author, expressed the opinion that it would be inadvisable for any state to attempt
to institute and carry on a land regisration act without a separate court to administer it, not-
withstanding the fact that a considerable degree of success has been attained in Cook County,
Illinois, in administering a land registration act through one of the prior existing courts.
99. TANNER, op. cit. supra note 12, at 26.
io0. "The Torrens System, if adopted, must either sustain an enormous cost on the
plant and court set-up or work on the search and abstract system, neither of which would
benefit the property owner, either in cost, security or time." UmSTED, A BRmF FOR TITLE
INSURANCE (1936) 6.
Io1. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, Supp. 1936) tit. 75, §§31-41.
io2. Staples, .rupra note 5o, at 202.
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once, as in New York, or more often, the loss of time incident to the service
of notice of the proceedings, the examination of the title, the inspection
of the site, the preparation of the examiner's report, the service of notice
thereof upon all parties in interest, as well as the time consumed in the
consideration of the examiner's report by the court, makes inevitable the lapse
of considerable time before the Torrens certificate may be issued. Thus the
popular impression that a certificate of title can be obtained in all instances
without delay is not a correct one. 103 Once a title is registered under
the Torrens system, it may be transferred voluntarily with comparative
safety and speed, but not until the purchaser has completed his search with
reference to possible bankruptcy, federal and other tax liens, rights of ten-
ants in possession and other objections which are excepted by a Torrens
title but which are covered by title insurance.10 4
VII. COMPULSORY LEGISLATION
Certain bills were introduced in New York State in 1936 to amend the
relatively unused Torrens law of that state 105 by providing for compul-
sory registration in the five counties comprising the city of New York. The
suggestion was also made that such registration should be compelled fol-
lowing all voluntary sales and mortgages. 10 The Torrens plan was made
compulsory in Germany in 1899. It is compulsory upon corpora-
tions in Hawaii, but it is discretionary in the states and other
territories of the United States. 10 7  The Land Registration Act
of Massachusetts provides for four alternative systems, (I) confirma-
tion of title with registration, (2) confirmation without registration fol-
lowed by transfers under the recording system,' 08 (3) transfer of title fol-
lowing examination by conveyancers or attorneys, and (4) transfer of title
upon examination and insurance by title companies. Massachusetts has
found no need for a compulsory system. 10 9
Under the recording system in use in Pennsylvania, a prospective pur-
chaser or a mortgagee can, as soon as he is satisfied with the state of the
103. "It is a popular fallacy that a layman can take a registered certificate of title and
deal with it with perfect safety. He can not." Davis, Chief Judge of the Land Court of
Massachusetts, quoted in TANNER, op. cit. supra note 12, at 26.
io4. See supra note 46.
1O5. Senate Bill Int. 735, Print 796; Assembly Bill Int. 991, Print 1035. The prin-
cipal bills considered by the legislature at Albany in 1936 were combined as Nos. 1455, 188o
and 2748, Int. 1231. The bill died in committee.
io6. Sabel, supra note 8I, at 252.
'07. Registration of solid blocks is in progress in London, under a compulsory regis-
tration system. PATTON, op. cit. supra note 14, at 18. See also PROBYN, SYSTEMt OF LAND
TENURE IN VARIoUS COUNTRIES (1881) 193. The statutes providing for optional initial
registration in the United States are listed supra note 13.
io8. 2 MASS. GEN. LAWS (1932) c. 185, § 56a.
1o9. The former senior judge of the Massachusetts Land Court has expressed strong dis-
approval of a compulsory act. See TANNER, op. Cit. supra note 12, at 29.
TORRENS TITLES AND TITLE INSURANCE
title either by an abstract or by a policy of title insurance, record a deed or
mortgage at a nominal expense. If a compulsory law were enacted, he would
be compelled to engage in a court proceeding in order that his title be regis-
tered and to subject himself to the delay, expense and inconvenience discussed
above. Such a law may well constitute a violation of the privileges and im-
munities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 10
Another important consideration is that unless such a scheme contem-
plated the purchase by the state of the plants of private companies which
represent an extremely large investment, the state would be required to
compete with the efficient service rendered by these established institutions.
To compete successfully, the state's charges obviously could not exceed those
of the private companies. Consequently, it would be necessary for the public
to subsidize the system, at least in its initial stages. A state registration
system sustained by a subsidy might well be attacked on constitutional
grounds."'
VIII. A COMPARISON WITH TITLE INSURANCE
In the metropolitan areas of Pennsylvania the title insurance policy
has practically replaced the abstracter's search. Outside of the larger urban
centers the abstracter and the conveyancer still prevail, except where large
mortgages or substantial conveyances are under consideration and corporate
title insurance is required. We have observed that a Torrens title will not
reduce the expense to the public, and that, for an original registration or an
involuntary transfer, there is no saving in time. It would therefore seem
to follow that if the Torrens system were adopted in Pennsylvania it would
be used as little as it has been used in other states."12  There is no great
demand for the Torrens system in rural communities, since rural tenures
are long-term, the title changes are infrequent, and most titles, even though
originally defective, have been perfected by adverse possession." 3 A factor
of considerable concern to owners of ground in this state is that, while
some mortgage loan companies and insurance companies do not object to
the principle of the Torrens system of land registration," 4 other lending
no. In Anderson v. Shepard, 285 II. 544, 121 N. E. 215 (ii8), a statute which
sought to compel administrators and executors to register title to real estate of their
decedents was held unconstitutional, on the grounds that the administrator or executor had
no interest in the real estate and that the act operated with inequality, in that it affected
only one group of owners of real estate.
The Hon. Clarence C. Smith, Associate Judge of the Land Court of Massachusetts, states:
"The practical objections to compulsory registration are so manifold that the academic ques-
tion of constitutionality is not worth considering." Letter to the author, March IO, 1937.
ini. See supra note 89.
112. See supra note 14.
113. McCall, supra note 14, at 344.
114. Patton, supra note I, at 531. Inquiries sent by the writer to the larger life insur-
ance companies disclose the lack of a uniform policy. Certain of these companies will loan
money secured by a mortgage or deed of trust on real estate where a Torrens certificate is
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institutions are unwilling to make a mortgage loan of $io,ooo or more unless
the Torrens certificate is accompanied by a satisfactory abstract or a policy
of title insurance. 115
Suggested reasons for the failure of the Torrens system to meet with
widespread popular approval are that the average land-owner does not desire
to invite a lawsuit by seeking to register a title which he considers good,
and that substantial lawsuits may arise from the attempt under a Torrens
proceeding to fix definite boundary lines. A title considered marketable
might be found to be unmarketable if disturbed, whereas if permitted to
remain dormant, the defect might be cured through lapse of time.-16 Fur-
thermore, the proceeding under the Torrens act merely registers good titles
and does not cure defective ones."" The Torrens system will not meet the
problem of marketability of title as effectively as does title insurance under
well organized companies.""
Should the cloud on the title be relatively minor, the title company can
and frequently does issue its policy to the grantee or mortgagee, taking a
bond from the grantor or mortgagor to protect it in the remote possibility
of loss. Without the assurance of such a policy, the advantage of the sale
or the mortgage would be lost to the owner. Should the holder of a policy
of title insurance sustain a loss, he has a claim against a corporation whose
reserves should, at all times, be adequate to meet the loss, and, as a general
rule, he is able to procure the payment of a just claim without the necessity
of instituting suit. Where the holder of a Torrens certificate seeks to assert a
claim against the assurance fund, he must not only prosecute that claim by a
legal proceeding, the costs of which are not compensable under the assur-
ance fund, but he must first exhaust his remedies against defendants other
than the custodian of the fund." 9 Although from the foregoing discussion
it seems apparent that title insurance in Pennsylvania serves the public inter-
est better than would the Torrens system of land registration, and that the
use of corporate title insurance should be extended, it does not follow that
submitted as evidence of title, without requiring any other evidence of title and without any
restriction as to the amount of the loan. Other companies will accept the Torrens title cer-
tificate in Massachusetts, Minnesota and Chicago. One substantial company has set a limita-
tion of $25,000 on such loans and, in the case of larger ones, requires title insurance in Illi-
nois, and in Minnesota and Massachusetts requires an abstract of the early title plus a detailed
investigation of the registration proceedings. Other companies require abstracts of title or
title insurance in all cases.
115. TANNER, op. cit. supra note 12, at 36. Mr. Tanner states that, of all the loans
made by the Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Company of California, only four are on Tor-
rens properties and these loans are likewise protected by title insurance; that, of the i,8oo
loans made by the United Bank & Trust Company of Los Angeles, less than one per cent
are on Torrens titles, and these are also protected by title insurance. Id. at 49.
I6. McCall, supra note 14, at 345.
H17. Partenfelder v. People, 211 N. Y. 355, 1o5 N. E. 675 (1914) ; In re Sherman, io6
Misc. 244, 175 N. Y. Supp. 627 (Sup. Ct. i919).
Ix8. See McClenachan v. Maris, 3io Pa. 99, 164 Atl. 780 (933).
xig. The arguments against the Torrens system are collected in 5 THomPsoN, REAL
PROPERTY (1924) c. LV.
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title insurance companies should be immune from reasonable regulation and
examination by the State.120
IX. REGULATION OF TITLE INSURANCE
The act which first authorized and as amended still authorizes a corpo-
ration to engage in the business of insuring titles 121 is the Pennsylvania
Corporation Act of 1874.122 In 1876 a group of conveyancers combined
their resources to establish The Real Estate Title and Insurance Company
of Philadelphia, the first corporation ever to issue a policy of title insur-
ance. In 1889 a minimum paid in capitalization of $125,000. was prescribed
for all such companies. 123 In 1929 they were by statute 124 required to
establish and maintain a reserve equal to ten per cent of the premium paid
on each policy of insurance thereafter issued until the total amount set aside
equaled $25o,ooo. This reserve fund must be retained by the company
separate and apart from its other assets, and must be invested in such securi-
ties as are legal investments for trust funds. When the State Secretary of
Banking closes such a company, he is authorized to use the reserve fund to
purchase reinsurance to cover liabilities represented by policies outstanding
against the fund. He may accordingly purchase a blanket policy from a
qualified Pennsylvania title insurance company. Each policy holder of the
company which originally issued the insurance then has a direct right of
action against the title company issuing the reinsurance.
125
The Act of May 17, 1933,120 confers upon the Insurance Department
of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania the power and duty to supervise,
examine and regulate title insurance companies. It authorizes the appoint-
ment of the Insurance Commission as liquidator of the title insurance busi-
ness of any company which also has the power to transact any business under
the supervision of the Department of Banking.
The public is entitled to consideration both with respect to the stan-
dardization of the form of policies and to the amount of protection given
I2O. A similar conclusion was reached by the Superintendent of Insurance of New York
State. SUPERINTENDENT OF INSURANCE OF THE STATE OF NEW YoRK, 78TH ANNUAL RE-
PORT TO THE LEGISLATURE (1937) 79, 80.
2I. The formation of such a corporation was first suggested in 1853. Report of Special
Committee of the Hennepin County Bar Ass'n (1935) i9 MINN. L. REV. 354, 357.
122. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1930) tit. 15, § 2481. This statute, insofar as the same
applies to title insurance companies, was not repealed by the Business Corporation Law of
May 5, 1933, PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, Supp. 1936) tit. I5, § 2852 et seq.
123. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 193o) tit. I5, § 2495, Cameron v. Christy, 286 Pa. 4o5,
133 AtI. 551 (1926) ; Corporations for Title Insurance, 12 Pa. D. & C. 719 (1929).
124. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, I93O) tit. 40, § 157.
125. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, Supp. 1936) tit. 40, §§ I6o-i6i. The fund carded on
the ledger of the trust company as a title insurance reserve account must be set aside for
the benefit of policy holders upon the insolvency of the company, even though it was actually
mingled with the assets of the institution. In re Counties Title and Trust Co., 21 Pa. D. &
C. 55 0934).
126. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, Supp. 1936) tit. 40, § 58. See also id. § 2o2, amending
the Insurance Code by the provision dealing with the liquidation of title insurance companies.
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to the policyholders. Generally speaking there are two types of policies
issued, one for the protection of mortgagees or lenders of money on real
estate, the other to indemnify purchasers of property. The forms used by
most Pennsylvania title companies for insuring mortgagees are substan-
tially similar to the L. I. C.3.2 and the A. T. A.1 2 8 forms. In no particular
is a policy issued by them to a mortgagee less advantageous than the L. I. C.
form. In some respects their policies are superior to it. For example, the
L. I. C. form insures the mortgagee against loss or damage not exceeding
a specified sum which is suffered "by reason of the failure or unmarketa-
bility of, defects in, . . . the title of the mortgagor." The forms used by
most Pennsylvania companies expressly insure the mortgagee that his title
to the mortgage "is good and marketable and clear of all liens and encum-
brances."
Where there is a conveyance subject to a mortgage, most Pennsylvania
companies use a form of policy which insures the grantee and all persons
claiming the real estate insured in the policy under the grantee by descent,
will or under the intestate laws, as well as all other persons to whom the
policy may be transferred with the assent of the title company endorsed on
the policy, that the title to the real estate is good and marketable and clear
of all liens and encumbrances as of the date of the policy, except those set
forth in a schedule annexed to the policy or specified by its general conditions.
Liability is limited to a specific sum.
At other times the owner, although paying the full premium for the
insurance of his equity, receives merely an owner's certificate. Such a certifi-
cate, which recites that the owner has paid the premium for the policy and
provides that when the mortgage is paid off and the mortgagee policy is
cancelled another policy will be issued to the owner, has been held inade-
quate.' 29  A form of owner's certificate now in use corrects this defect some-
what by a provision that until the policy issued to the mortgagee is sur-
rendered for cancellation and a new policy is issued in lieu thereof, the policy
held by the mortgagee and the owner's certificate shall be construed to be a
contract of indemnity for the protection jointly of the mortgagee and the
127. Following the War the life insurance companies became interested in title insur-
ance to protect their investments in real estate securities. They were confronted by many
types of policies and instituted a movement towards uniformity. Their representatives
drafted a form of mortgagee policy known as the "L. I. C." (Life Insurance Company) Stand-
ard Loan Policy of Title Insurance.
128. Following conferences between representatives of the life insurance companies and
representatives of the American Title Association, there was drafted in 1929 the "A. T. A."
form. See Special Committee of the Hennepin County Bar Association, supra note 21, at
354, 366.
129. Cherry v. People's Trust Co., 282 Pa. 52, 127 Atl. 320 (1925). Even if all that
happens between the owner, the mortgagee and the title company is considered as one
transaction, the owner has not, by the very terms of such certificate, any enforceable rights
under it until the fulfillment of the express conditions stipulated. So long as the title
policy to the mortgagee is still outstanding, the owner may not maintain an action on such
a certificate.
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owner so long as the owner continues to hold title to the premises. While
this proviso cures to a great extent the effect of the above decision, neverthe-
less the title companies should not only issue a policy to the mortgagee
for the amount of the mortgage, but in place of the owner's certificate there
should be issued a separate policy insuring the owner's equity which pro-
vides that if and when the mortgage is paid off and the mortgagee's policy
is cancelled, the insurance to the owner will be increased by the amount of
the insurance theretofore outstanding in favor of the mortgagee.
Except with respect to the owner's certificate there would seem to be
no criticism as to the form of policies in use in Pennsylvania and no need
in this state for a statute such as exists in Texas, which treats title insur-
ance as in the nature of a public utility and provides for state control over
rates and the types of policies issued. 30
The principal question to be considered in Pennsylvania in view of the
existing legislation is whether the required reserves are adequate. By the
Act of 1929, the reserve fund must be kept at one-quarter of a million
dollars notwithstanding current losses.131  Under the act it is a fund to be
maintained for the protection of all policy holders, to be used in the event
of liquidation either for the payment of outstanding claims under: policies
or for the purchase of reinsurance to indemnify outstanding policy holders.
Since this fund must be kept intact, it is essential that a separate reserve be
established out of current earnings to meet current losses.
In most forms of insurance the risk is of loss due to an event subsequent
to the date of the policy, and therefore substantial reserves are essential. In
the case of title insurance the loss is not with respect to a risk arising subse-
quent to the effective date of the policy, but is only in the event that a risk
of the type insured against exists on the effective date of the policy.' 32
Title insurance companies should be required to charge as a liability,
in addition to their capital stock, outstanding indebtedness of the company
and the reserves required by the Act of 1929, additional reserves in an
amount adequate to meet current losses. A reserve for current losses could
be established by requiring a definite percentage of all gross premiums col-
lected from and after a certain day to be set aside to meet current losses
until the reserve totals $ioo,ooo.
130. TEX. STAT. (Vernon, Supp. 193), art. 1302a. And see Daniel v. Tyrell & Garth
Inv. Co., 93 S. W. (2d) 372 (Tex. 1936).
131. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1930) tit. 40, § 152.
132. Where, at the time the policy is delivered to an insured mortgagee, the title in-
sured is defective by reason of a lien insured against, the title company is immediately
liable to the insured even though the loss is not presently liquidated. In such a case, the
measure of damages is the difference between the market value of the mortgage which is in
fact subject to the prior lien and what the market value of the mortgage would have been
had it not been subject to such prior lien. Fifth Mutual Bld'g Soc. of Manayunk's Appeal, 317
Pa. I6i, 176 Atl. 494 (1935). See also Foehrenbach v. German-Am. Title & Trust Co., 217
Pa. 331, 66 Atl. 561 (907) ; Schwab v. Cornell, 3o6 Pa. 536, i6o Atl. 449 (1932) ; Nar-
berth B. & L. Ass'n v. Bryn Mawr Trust Co., Pa. Super. Ct., Feb. 26, I937.
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In addition thereto, when unpaid claims of which the title company
has notice aggregate ten per cent of its reserves for current losses, the com-
pany should be required to set aside a special reserve equal to the aggregate
estimated amount due or to become due on account of such unpaid claims
upon title insurance policies from and after the time of notice until the final
determination thereof. Reserves for current losses should be held for the
purpose of satisfying claims under policies without distinction as to when
the contract of title insurance or other transaction was entered into or where
the property was located. All income arising from the securities or other,
assets in the fund and all profits resulting from their sale, after the deduction
of all taxes payable with respect to them, should be added to the fund.
Title companies must recognize the fact that adequate reserves must
be segregated and kept as trust funds for the payment of current losses.
Otherwise they may be required to deposit with the Insurance Commissioner,
or some other public officer, securities in direct proportion to the contingent
liability upon outstanding title policies.
Title companies should be prohibited from issuing policies which do
not bear a reasonable relationship to their capital and surplus. However,
existing legislation in other states with respect to such a limitation 133 fails
to recognize the obvious fact that title policies do not insure against future
hazards as do surety bonds in connection with building contracts. A limita-
tion prohibiting a single risk in excess of a definite number of times the exist-
ing capital and surplus of a corporation might well be enacted in Pennsylva-
nia. It is the practice of some small companies to reinsure with other under-
writers of title insurance wherever the policy is large in proportion to the
capital and surplus of the originating company. 184 Metropolitan companies
should be able to assume ordinary risks without the necessity of such rein-
surance.
Directors should be bona fide stockholders owning a substantial number
of shares in the company. A substantial fraction of the capital and paid-in
surplus of a title company should consist of assets other than mortgages and
the accompanying bonds. A title insurance company should not engage in
the business of guaranteeing the payment of mortgages or in selling certifi-
cates or participations in bonds, notes or other evidences of indebtedness
secured by mortgages or deeds of trust.
1 35
133. Texas limits a single risk to fifty per cent of the capital and surplus. See TEx.
STAT. (Vernon, Supp. 1931) art. 13o2a, § II. In 28 STAT. 279, amended by 36 STAT. 241, 6
U. S. C. A. § 9 (1927), Congress has made elaborate provision for the safe use of surety
companies as security upon bonds.
134. 9 PROC. AM. TIT. Ass'N (1929) 68.
135. McCall, supra note 14, at 337; Sabel, supra note 81, at 249; see In re Commercial
Trust Co., No. i, i Pa. D. & C. io9 (1933).
TORRENS TITLES AND TITLE INSURANCE
Legislation should specifically provide that if the proper state official
finds from the report of any examiner or otherwise, after reasonable notice
and hearing, that the value of the assets in any of the several reserve funds
is less than the amount prescribed by law, he may, unless such deficiency
is made good within a reasonable time, order such title company to cease
doing further title business; and it should be a misdemeanor for any officer
of the company, after such an order is received, to transact or participate
in the transaction of any new business of the kind prohibited until the title
company has remedied the situation.
13 6
The premiums paid for title insurance in the United States are neces-
sarily divergent. The risk assumed differs in the different localities.
The type of service likewise differs. Because of the varying
state of the public records the cost of examining the risk varies with
communities. In one community it is necessary to search through fourteen
different offices to obtain tax information. And in Pennsylvania the manner
of keeping public records should be improved. Rates are based on two
fundamental costs, the cost of examining title, and the cost of insuring title.
Items of cost incident to examining title are those pertaining to preparing
the abstract of title, examining, maintaining and interpreting the assembled
data. The precise cost of insuring the title is difficult to determine despite
the fact that some companies have more than fifty years of loss experience.
Losses arise at irregular intervals and it is difficult to reduce the risks to
a mathematical calculation. The rates usually include a reasonable share
of the insurer's overhead and should include a fair return on the capital
invested. The rates charged are in effect a fee for a highly specialized tech-
nical service supplemented by an obligation insuring the accuracy of that
service.
Whether the full title charges should be required where a second policy
is issued within a reasonably short time after a deed or mortgage has been
insured is a question which depends for its answer, inter alia, on whether
or not bankruptcy, death, or some other factor has intervened subsequently
to the date of the prior policy, which necessitates services by the title company
other than a mere continuation of the abstract and a tax and judgment search.
If bankruptcy, death, or some such similar factor intervenes, the company
must make ai extensive search for which the applicant should be required
to pay. On request Philadelphia companies will keep a title open for a
reasonable time in order to enable a mortgage to be created or a subsequent
deed to be made and insured.
Title companies should refrain from misleading advertisements such
as those suggesting that title insurance removes all risk. They should re-
frain from issuing opinions on titles, preparing deeds, mortgages, contracts,
136. See, in this connection, PA. STAT. AN. (Purdon, i93o) tit. 40, § I5i et seq.
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or doing any acts which constitute the practice of the law. 137 Policies should
set forth clearly and specifically those matters not covered by the insurance
and the conditions precedent to the enforcement of liability under the policy.
This should appear in type of a size which is easily legible and should be
expressed in such a way as to enable the layman to comprehend just what
is not covered by the insurance. Whenever reasonably possible a loss should
be paid without a claimant's being subjected to the necessity of suit. As
is the custom in Philadelphia, title policies should insure marketability of
title except as to specified items which cannot be reasonably so covered.
Policies to mortgagees should be assignable by delivery without the neces-
sity for a specific approval by the company.
Philadelphia is the home of title insurance. Much of the criticism
directed against title companies in other states of the union has no applica-
tion to the companies now functioning in Pennsylvania. Nevertheless, it
behooves the title companies to put their own houses in order in the par-
ticulars suggested in this article. Only by improving in every possible way
the service rendered to the public, by reducing to the greatest possible extent
the cost of their services, and by refraining religiously from engaging in the
practice of law can title companies escape from onerous regulations by the
state and from the necessity of meeting again and again the recurrent claims
of proponents of a state title insurance system.
137. Childs v. Smeltzer, 315 Pa. 9, i7I Atl. 883 (934) ; In re Umble's Est., 1I7 Pa.
Super. 15, 177 Atl. 340 (1935). See also Atlanta Title & Trust Co., 172 Ga. 437, 157 S. E.
455 (1931).
